This paper presents the development of a test technique for revalidation of the Space Shuttle orbiter Main Propulsion System during ground turnaround operalions between llighls of the Space Transportalion System (STS). The Main Propuislon System consists of the three Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME's) and the Main Propulsion System (MPS) connecting the SSME's to the orbiteriground and orbilerIExternal Tank (ET) interfaces.
. ,
-applications are described.
l "
The Space Shuttle orbiter Main Propulsion System uses liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen for fuel and oxidizer. One of the earliest concerns associated with STS liights was minimizing potential leakage of these propellants from both cryogenic and high pressure (6000 psi gaseous hydrogen) sysiems so as to prevent the buildup of a flammable hydrogen mixture in the aft fuselage during ascent. Studies were performed to establish the ascent flammability limit and a significant effort was made to leak test these propellant systems prior to each of the first five flights of Columbia (OV-l02)? The ability to limit ambient leakage to avoid ascent flammability conditlons was considered to be of paramount importance. By the time the second shuttle vehtcie. Challenger (OV-099). arrived at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). for initial processing prior to the STS-6 mission, wnfiience had been gained that ground leak lest procedures were assuring a non-flammable orbiter aft compartment environment during ascent.
-__ ' Lead Main Propulsion Systems Enaineer detailed to Vandenberg AFB, CA; Al.i. 4 Member; "Lead Main Engines Systems Engineer; "'Main Propulsion Systems Specialist;
A I M Member u The Challenger Flight Readiness Firing (FRF). a sialic liring of the three SSME's at the KSC launch pad, on December 18, 1982 challenged that confidence when post firing data review revealed that MPSSSME hydrogen gas leakage detected during the test was preater than 100,000 Standard Cubic Inches/Minute (scim). If launch had been attempted. the aft compartment flammability limit would have been exceeded. The STS-6 launch was postponed indefinitely until the leak 9ource was located .5 This paper documents the development of a test technique. the Aft Compartment/MPS/SSME Helium Signature Test (HST). that was first used to help solve the pre-STS. 6 leakage problem. and then refined to an important pre-flight leak test. MainProoulslon ' s r s t e m The Main Propulsion System is shown in Figure 2 . Located in the orbiter aft compartment. the MPS controls the flow of cryogenic propellants, purge and pressurant gases lo and from the SSME's. Specifically . the MPS consists of the following subsystems: liquid hydrogen propellant feed, (fill and draln. bleed, and recirculation lines), liquid oxygen propellant feed, (fill and drain, bleed, and pogo suppression lines), gaseous hydrogen (OH2 ET pressurization) system. and gaseous oxygen (GO2 ET pressurlzation) system. The orbiter portions of these systems downstream of the OrbiterlET and orbiter/ground interfaces are individually leak tested durlng the HST. The MPS also contains gaseous helium and nitrogen pneumatic systems which provide pressurization and purge gas for MPS/SSME operation and conditioning. A simplified propeiiant flow schematic with nominal operating pressures and temperatures is shown in 
NOMENCLATURE
The purge, vent, and drain system provides the unpressurized compartments of the orbiter with either a nitrogen or air purge that thermally conditions system components and prevents hazardous gas accumuiation. This system also vents compartments during ascent and takes in air during descent to minimize differential pressures.
The purge system carries conditioned gas from ground support equipment (GSE) l o the orbiter cavities via the starboard aft umbilical during preflight and postflight operations. Purge gas is provided lo three separate sets of distribution plumbing: (1) 
~~M a i f l E n Q i n E
The SSME Is a reusable, variable thrust. cryogenic hydrogen/orygen engine that represents the state of the art operational liquid rocket propulsion technology. The SSME.
-shown schematically In Figure 4 . utilizes a two stage power cycle in whlch propellants are partially combusted at relatively low temperature in two preburners. drive two propellant turbo-pumps. then are fully combusted at high temperature and pressure In the Main Combustion Chamber (MCC) before being expanded through a 773 area ratio nozzle. The SSME operates at a 6:l LOULH2 mass flow mixture ratio and is capable of variable performance from 65 to 104 percent of a rated 375,000 Ibf sea level thrust. Nominal operating conditions at the 100% thrust level are shown in Figure 4 . The LH2. LO2. and hot gas portions of the SSME are leak tested In conjunction with the appropriate MPS subsystems during the HST.'
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Fiwm 4. SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE SCHEMATIC
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During the initial OV-099 FRF, operation of all orbiter systems was nominal and functionally the test was considered a success. Immediately following engine shutdown, however, the concentration of hydrogen gas in the aft fuselage reached an unexpectedly high value (4600 PPM). Subsequent data review and analysis indicated the peak hydrogen concentrations may have been considerably higher. The source of the hydrogen had to be isolated and corrected before the orbiter could be committed to flight. lnltlal troubleshooting to isolate the source of the leak considered two possibilities: ( 1 ) an actual teak external to an MPSSSME subsystem leaking Into the aft fuselage or (2) ingestion of hydrogen from outside the vehicle driven by SSME stanup andlor shutdown transients. However, neither hypothesis could be confirmed after an extensive review of the existing test data. Concurrent with the data review ground test personnel performed leak tests of ail MPS & SSME fluid connections using mass spectrometer hand held probe techniques.
Despite Intensive around-the-clock efforts, no significant leakage could be found. As a result. a decision was made to conduct a second FRF with sufficient additional instrumentation to allow isolation of the hydrogen leakage source. A second FRF was performed on January 25. 1983 and the previous leakage results were confirmed. The leakage source was internal to the an fuselage and must be found prior to launch5 Y At this point it became obvious that a new leak test concept was needed to isolate and find the leak source(s). A test was devised that would allow direct measurement of any MPSlSSME subsystem external leakage into the aft companment by means of purge air transport of that leakage to a single gas concentration sample point. In this way, a "signature" of helium test gas leakage into the aft compartment would be obtained. A similar leak test method had been utilized for the orbiter aft umbilical cryogenic interface connections!'
As the planning and preparation for this signature test continued, a new search of the aft fuselage for leakage found a leak source on SSME #I MCC. Flowmeter leak tests indicated a leakage of -425 scim at -40 psig. However, analytical exlropolation of this ambient leakage to the SSME firing conditions showed that an additional leak source had to be present to account for all the aft fuselage hydrogen concentrations. The helium signature test (HST) indicated that the SSME #I leak was -360 scim, but also revealed that SSME #2 had an additional leakage of 25 SCi m. This test was also performed at -40 psig. After still more leak tests this leakage source was also isolated. These SSMEs were subsequently replaced and the STS-6 mission successfuily flown. As a result of this experience, the HST was refined and immediately implemented as a final MPS revalidation test prior to each subsequent STS flight.
A?cellileakt?slecm The curve marked flammabliity limit depicts 4% by volume hydrogen-hair mixture; 4% is widely accepted as the flammability limit for H2 in air? Thus accumulation of hydrogen In the aft, composed of both external leakage from the MPS and ingestion of the hydrogen-rich SSME plume must be less than this limit to assure safe Shuttle flight operation. Ascent hydrogen concentrations are currently measured by six pyro-initiated. evacuated gas sample bottles that are mounted near the port and starboard vent doors. These bottles provide discrete gas samples at selected times during the boost phase. The bottles are analyzed post-flight for hydrogen and oxygen content. Data from STS-t thru -4 are presented in Figure 8 . These results are typical of all Shuttle flights.
ProoellantmLeak-
During pre-launch propellant loading tha HGDS samples the effluent purge gas exiting both port and startxard vent doors and provides real time gas concentrations to launch controllers in the LCC. Thus the HGDS provides a means of determining the leakage of those systems exposed to cryogenic conditions prior to liftoff.
These systems include the LO2 and LH2 MPS/SSME propellant feed systems defined previously. However, only 1% of the pre-flight leakage has the potential of being from high pressure leak paths since 61% of the fluid joints that are exposed to up to 6000 psi in flight do not see any hydrogen during propellant loading prior to SSME ignition. Thus, leak testing of this portion of the hot gas system must be completed during ambient conditions prior to cryogenic loading. Helium is used as a test gas because of its inert characteristics. Leak testing with hydrogen would cause undue safety hazards for personnel. Since the density ratio of helium to hydrogen is 2:l at amblent temperatures. leak testing with helium most closely approximates an ambient hydrogen leakage rate.
PURGE SOURCE
Q
Whenever design provisions allow, flanged connections are checked by using a flowmeter. Threaded. brazed and welded connections are checked by either the soap solution technique o! e mass spectrometer probing technique. Asoap solution test is performed by applying a thin film of high surface tension fluid onto the internally pressurized joint and visually inspecting for bubble formation indicative of a leak. Mass spectrometer probe tests are performed by slowly transversing a probe connected to a helium mass spectrometer leak detector around the circumference of the test joint. A helium leakage is identified as a positive increase above the ambient helium background.
Unlike the previously mentioned techniques. the pressure decay test method provides a quantitative leak test of the total pressurized volume. However, the sensitivity of this method is severely iimlted by the internal leakage characteristics of MPSISSME components (Le.. shutoff valves, check valves, elc.). Many of these components have allowable leakage limits that exceed the allowable system external leakage limits. In addition, these internal leakages are often variable with time and mechanism cycles so that the pressure decay test method provides only a gross indication of system integrity.
Each of the above leak detection techniques was used to revalidate the orbiter MPS between flights. The pressure decay test was the only system level test performed prior to development of the HST. The HST has the advantage of measuring only external leakage and ai% allows the entire SSME hot gas system to be tested. which is not practical with a pressure decay test. approximately 4500 cubic ft. containing the MPS/SSME subsystems which are to be tested for external leaks. Each of these subsystems is connected to a helium pressurization source capable of providing 40 psig for the propellant and SSME hot gas subsystems and 400 psig for the pressurization subsystems. Once pressurized, any external leakage from a given subsystem mixes with the an compartment air purge and is convected out a single opening. This effluent gas stream is sampled for helium concentration through a sample line connected .to a helium mass spectrometer leak detector. Helium concentration is then converted to an equivalent volumetric leakage rate using a calibration relationship determined by injection of a known helium flowrate into the aft compartment.
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A diagram of the test setup used during Orbiter checkout is shown in Figure 6 . The liquid hydrogen propellant feed subsystem is shown, including the SSME hot gas systems. MPS subsystem pressurization sources (not shown) are connected through both Orblter/ground aft umbliicais (LHZGH2 through the port umbilical: LOUGO2 through the -. 
This test can be run while the vehicle is horizontal in the OPF or verllcal at the launch pad. When the test is run in the OPF, a portable mass spectometer Is used. When the test is run at lhe launch pad, a permanently installed multiple gas analyzer is used which is part of an integrated vehicldground Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDS). A schematic of this unit is shown in Figure 7 
Iaslpparatipn
The HST test sequence consists of: (1) pre-test setup. (2) helium calibration runs, (3) subsystem pressurization runs, (4) post-test calibration runs. and (5) post test securing of setup and equipment.
Pre-test setup is extensive, requiring installation of all ground support equipment (GSE) shown in Figure 6 . Olher equipment not shown Includes a throttling fixture external to the port vent door that allows control of the aft compartment pressure differential to 0.5-0.9 inches of water (0.016 -0.032 PSID). A differential pressure gage provides a continuous check of aft compartment sealing. This sealing is critical to maximize the purge effluent that exits through the port vent door.
Prior to start of calibratlon. the aft compartment background hellum concentration is measured to establish a baseline concentratlon. Helium is then injected into the all through Test Hose 1 (TH I), initially at 6 scim. Helium concentration is monltored for a minimum of 30 minutes until a steady-state concentration is achieved. The background value measured at test start is then subtracted from this steady-state value, resuiting in a concentration difference which Is plotted against the 6 scim injected + _ flowrate. Helium flowrate is then increased to 15 scim and the above process repeated to obtain a second calibralion point. A final value IS obtained for 25 scim injected flowrate. The resuiting caiibratlon relationship is then checked for linearity with respect lo the origin and, if satisfactory. the helium injection Is terminated for TH 1. The helium concentration Is then allowed to return to a steady background level. The calibration process Is repeated for other points in the an compartment. Note that the Injection flowrates of 6, 15, and 25 scim were determined based on an analysis of the minimum leak rate measurable with the mass spectrometers available at KSC. This value was predicted lo be 6 scim.
Uncertainty is calculated using a procedure which accounts for uncertainties in the concentration and flowrate measurements and Instrument drift with time In Ihe mass spectrometer. The uncertainty in teak rate for the current test equipment and configuration has averaged t 3 scim.6" Following completion of Ihe calibration sequence, each MPS subsystem Is pressurized and leak tested individually. The procedure Is the same as used durlng the calibration run. except that the deita helium concentration Is used to obtain an equivalent leak rate from the calibration relationship. If the sum of corrected leakage value and I s upper range uncertainty exceeds 12 scim. the subsystem In question is considered out of specification. and isolation of the indicated leak source begins. In this way, the HST provides an Overall subsystem level verification of propellant system integrity after all preceding point-to-point leak checks are complete.
Following completion of subsyslem pressurlzation runs. a post-test calibration run is performed to verify that test setup configuration and instrumentation integrity has been maintained throughout the test. 
Calibration-
The HST sensitivity and gas sampling system efficiency were measured by injecting helium at various locations in the an fuselage during calibration runs. Results of this calibration are presented in Figure 9 for OV-103. The results are typical of all orbiter vehicles in a vertical orientation. The ideal mixing line is obtained from the followlng equation:
A L H~ ETIORB UMB -NO PURGE 17- 8.841 A LH? ETIORB UMB -W SCFM PURGE 11-14451 0 sSME No. 1 (1) incomplete mixing of helium leakage with purge air, and (2) incomplete sealing of the aft compartment. As Figure 9 indicates, leaks injected in regions of high alr purge velocities. such as TH 1 near the purge circuit (PC) #3 bulk exit and near each SSME hot gas system. best approximate the ideal mixing concentration.
TH 1 results have been consistent and repeatable from orbiter to orbiter, and best approximale ideal mixing of any aft compartment injection location. Thus, TH 1 results have always been used to determine the calibration relationship for subsequent subsystem pressurization runs.
One propellant loading and ambient leak detection limitation is the relative inability to detect the exact location of a leak in the particular subsystem under test. Since leaking helium is transported lo the aff fuselage vent door sample port by means of both molecular diffusion and forced convection, the superposition of these two mechanisms along with the complex geometry of the MPS Installation render an analytical prediction of helium distribution impossible. For this reason. leakage has been simulated at.other locations in the aft fuselage.
These simulated leakages at other points In the aft fuselage are also shown in Figure 9 . The simulated leak at the OH2 flow control valve location is detected as -200% of the ideal value. The GH2 flow control valves are located approximately 5 feet from the sample port location. This indicates that a leak near the vent door sample port is entrained by the effluent gas Stream exiting the vent door before completely mixing in the aft fuselage for reasonable test durations. Fortunately. most of the potential leak sources are located sumciently distant from the vent door to allow adequate mixing with the aft fuselage purge.
Leakage was also simulated from the LH2 ET/Orbiter disconnect area when the orbiter was in a vertical orientation. This leakage produced concentrations less than 10% of ideal without auxiliary purge air directed to the area. This demonstrates inadequate mixing In these areas and can be explained by the fact that (1) this part of the aft fuselage has significant structural leakage, (2)bouyancy effects allow helium to rise to the top of the aft fuselage from injection locations where forced convection effects are negligible. This problem has been solved by providing a dedicated purge of 134 scfm to each dismnnect area to force this leakage to the vent door. Flgure 9 shows the effect that an intermediate purge value of 53 scfm produced at the LH2 umbilical in the vertical anitude.
Although not shown In Figure 9 . prior to incorporating the auxiliary purge in the horizontal test configuration. Although these resuits demonstrate the value of locally enhanced mixing it is not practical to provide a special purge to every stagnant area. Since tests have shown that simulated leakage at other leak locations result in concentrations of approximate 75% of ideal, a correction factor of 1.25 has been chosen lo account for these differences. This wrrection factor is applied to the leakage reading obtained during subsystem pressurization run based on the TH 1 calibration curve. This is a conservative approach since a majority of the most critical potential leak locations are in areas an of the PC #3 bulk alr purge exit plane where mixing is maximized.
B.a!&i SvbsvstemPIessurlzallon
. .
Following the STS-6 OV-099 experience the development of the helium signature test method received a high priorily in the Shuttle program. Several improvements in system sensitivity. measurement technique. data analysis and purge distribution were gradually incorporated to enhance the reliability of the test. Because of these Changes. HST accuracy is now estimated to be i 3 scim when leakage Is in the 0 to 25 scim range.
However, the LH2 feed system leakage measured prior to OV-103 Flight #3 is an example which demonstrates that in some instances. system accuracy is much better than f3 scim. Prior to this flight. lhe HST indicated a leakage of 13 scim at 40 psig. After the leak source was discovered a flowmeter leak test was performed resulting in an measured leakage of 12 scim at 40 psig. The only other leak that has been found above the 12 scim allowable limit was located on an SSME MFV Range. The signature test for OV.099 Flight #2 identified this leakage to be 75 scim at 40 psig. Neither of these leaks were found during point-to-point leak testing.
Both of these leaks were repaired prior to propellant loading.
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The results of the HST subsystem pressurization runs, averaged over all HST runs to date, are presented in Figure  10 for each orbiter. Note that the two out-of-tolerance leaks mentloned above are not reflected in these values. The retest leakage from the HST run after the leaks were repaired has -been incorporated. Generally, ambient leakage from any system is primarily affected by component removal and displiy the highest average leakage ior each orbiter. with the exception of OV-103, which has a larger GO2 pressurization system leakage. This can be accounted for by a known, One of the critical ground testing limitations is an inability to approach flight operating pressures during leak test. Specifically. the main combustlon chamber throat plug des!gn does not allow pressurization of the SSME hot gas system above 40 psig. However, portions of this system operate at 6000 psla during ascent. Figure 11 shows the relationship between helium leakage at leak test conditions (55 psla, 70" F) and the equivalent gaswus hydrogen leakage at flight operating pressure and temperature. This analysis assumes that a typical leak can be modeled as a choked orifice of constant area and discharge Coeffkient. The line shown is for a hypothetical leak in the SSME hot gas system at worst case conditions, Le. GH2 AT 6000 psla. -160" F.
A comparlson of predicted leakage and actual ascent gas sample bottle data is shown in Figure 12 for OV-099 and !he net uncertainly in gas sample bonte leak rate is estimated to be approximately t i 0 0 0 scim. Second, a fraction of the OV-099 and OV-I03 ascent leakage is caused by LH2 feed system leak sources rather than hot gas system leaks. This can be seen in Tables 2 and 3 and 13 supports this rationale.
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A second important limitlng factor for ground testing of liquid propellant systems is an inability to simulate the thermal conditions that the cryogenic propellants Impose on connections. This problem is reflected in the comparison of W2 system leakage shown in Tables 2 and 3 . No correiatlon is immediately apparent from the data. Generally, the cryogenic hydrogen leak rates are two orders of magnitude larger than the HST helium values. This may be due to two factors. First. a portion of the LH2 feed system upstream of the ET/orblter 17 inch feed and 4 inch recirculation valves is not pressurized during the HST. Thus, leakage from these valves. whlch can enter the aft compartment during prelift-off cryogenlc propellant loading, is not reflected in the HST data. Secondly. cryogenic temperatures often increase an ambient leakage rate to a value many times higher than expected.
For Instance, the seal between two materials that have different thermal conductivities may be altered due to unequal thermal contractions, allowing increased leakaoe at cryogenic temperatures. It is very dimcult to predic4 how any non-conformance in a mechanical or metallurgical joint will react to the change in temperature between ambient and LH2 temperatures (-420' F). Thus no anempt has been made in thls paper to predict the amount of cryogenic leakage that could be expected for the HST results.
As a result of the successful implementation of the HST into ground turnaround operations. a similar leak test was created to check each SSME prior to installation into the orbiter. The test utilizes a flexible bag-like enclosure placed around the SSME to create a sealed control volume. Several leaks have been found and corrected prior to SSME installations.
Originally, the Shuttle Centaur upper stage vehicle was to be loaded with LH2 and LO2 during launch countdown while positioned In the Space Shuttle cargo bay. Preparations were underway to perform a helium signature test to verify Centaur vehicle leak integrity prior to launch countdown. Cancellation of the Centaur program occurred before this test could be run.
-
The STS External Tank consists of liquid oxygen and hydrogen tanks that are separated by an intertank structure.
The HST method may be used to verify that these fuel and oxygen tanks are ready for each Shuttle mission. The Shuttle fuel cells which are located in the orbiter midbody also use LH2 and LO2 for power generation in flight. An HST is being considered to utilize the HST as a final leak test for the fuel ceils.
Additional applications of the HST could include the National Aerospace Plane (NASP), the Space Station. and a second generation Shuttle or heavy lift launch vehicle. Speciflcaliy, automated or self-test capability designed into these next generation space systems would allow simplified r/ calibration. pressurization and leak monitoring/ measurement based on the HST method. For example, NASP fuel and engine mmpartments exposed to potential hydrogen leakage would contain built-in hydrogenlhelium gas detectlan instrumentation. helium distribution lines for injection of calibrated leakage, and vent doors which would allow sealing the compartment down to a single opening. A ground helium pressurization source would be connected to the vehicle, and an HST could be controlled automaticaily by an on-board flight computer. Any excessive leakage would be identified for further investigation by ground crews. The HST could thus provide a relatively quick system level revalidation that would support the very short turnaround (Le. a few days) proposed for NASP. Similarly. designed in HST capability could save many hours of astronaut troubieshooting during on-orblt testing of fluid systems integrity on the Space
Station.
These examples demonstrate the versatility and signiflcance of the test application within the rocket industry. Most cryogenic or high pressure systems should be utilizing this technique when external leakage of hazardous fluids into closed volumes must be minimized.
